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For the want of certainty:  










In 2014, in the wake of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruling in Case C-
162/13 Damijan Vnuk v Zavarovalnica Triglav, the law relating to compulsory motor vehicle 
insurance began to undergo significant change. Nationally, the requirement for the owner of a 
motor vehicle to possess insurance cover applies where the vehicle is used on a road or other 
public place; yet, Vnuk extended the obligation to vehicles on private land. However, beyond 
disquiet from some sectors as to this extension, there remains uncertainty at statutory and 
jurisprudential levels. According to Case C-80/17 Fundo de Garantia Automóvel v Juliana, 
immobilised vehicles stored on private land but which are capable of being driven are subject 
to compulsory motor vehicle insurance. In Case C‑ 514/16 Andrade v Crédito Agrícola 
Seguros, the requirement for compulsory motor vehicle insurance applies only where the 
vehicle is used as a means of transport. Andrade appears overly restrictive and may operate to 
defeat the protection the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives (MVID) have sought to achieve. 
The co-existence of Juliana and Andrade creates uncertainty. Clarification is needed, through 
a seventh MVID or direction from the CJEU, as to the continuation of Andrade as a source of 
authority and to when and in which circumstances motor vehicles must be insured. 
 
Keywords: Andrade v Crédito Agrícola Seguros [2018], Damijan Vnuk v Zavarovalnica 
Triglav [2014], Fundo de Garantia Automóvel v Juliana [2018], motor vehicle insurance, 
Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives, the obligation to insure, Road Traffic Act 1988.  
 
A. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The Road Traffic Act 1988 (RTA) is the principal legislative provision for the regulation of 
the use of motor vehicles, offences, third party liabilities and insurance. In most cases it 
ensures the blameless victims of the negligent driving of motor vehicles have access to 
compensation. National law requires the owners of vehicles to have, as a minimum, third 
party (liability) motor insurance for vehicles used on a road or other public place.
1
 Further, 
for the victims of uninsured or untraced drivers, the Second
2
 Motor Vehicle Insurance 
Directive (MVID) imposed an obligation on each Member State to establish a guarantee fund 
to act as the insurer of last resort. In the UK, this position is occupied by the Motor Insurers’ 
Bureau (MIB) through two extra-statutory arrangements (the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 
2015 (along with the Supplementary Agreement concluded in 2017) and the Untraced 
Drivers Agreement 2017). The MIB and its Agreements established with the Secretary of 
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Thus, national and EU laws regulate the system of compulsory motor vehicle insurance. This 
regulation is broad and covers a range of obligations on insurers and the insured policy 
holders. Pertinent to this case note is the approach taken by each source of law to define the 
term ‘motor vehicle’ and to the physical extent of the obligation to possess insurance cover. 
We present an argument that the RTA, as the statute which establishes the extent of 
compulsory motor vehicle insurance, along with the extra-statutory agreements between the 
Secretary of State and the MIB, are too restrictive in scope and fail to adequately give effect 
to case law from the CJEU. Further, the Court of Appeal ruling in MIB v Lewis,
6
 that Articles 
3 and 10 of the sixth MVID are directly effective
7
 and the MIB is an emanation of the State,
8
 
further exacerbate the need for prompt action to clarify national and EU law on the scope of 
compulsory motor vehicle insurance. 
 
B. Defining ‘motor vehicle,’ ‘use’ and the geographic scope of compulsory 
insurance 
 
The obligation on the owner of a motor vehicle to hold third party insurance is provided in 
Part VI of the RTA. At section 143 of the RTA a person may not use (or cause to be used) a 
motor vehicle on a road or other public place unless there is in force in relation to the use of 
the vehicle insurance or security in respect of third party risks. An offence is committed for 
transgression of this obligation unless a statutory exclusion is applicable.
9
 Section 185 of the 
RTA defines a motor car as ‘a mechanically propelled vehicle, not being a motor cycle or an 




 in the CJEU, and at the Court of First Instance, Advocate-General Mengozzi, 
explained how the MVID had expanded the concept and definition of ‘motor vehicle.’ 
Referring to Art.1 of the first MVID, ‘vehicle’ for the purposes of that Directive ‘means any 
motor vehicle intended for travel on land and propelled by mechanical power, but not 
running on rails, and any trailer, whether or not coupled…’ (authors’ emphasis). There was 
no restriction for a vehicle to be used on a road to fall under the remit of compulsory 
insurance cover. The original drafting of the RTA confined compulsory motor insurance to 
motor vehicles used on a road. This disparity between EU and national law was raised in 
Clarke v Kato and Cutter v Eagle Star Insurance Ltd,
11
 where the third party victims had 
                                                 
3
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suffered injury due to the actions of negligent drivers in a car park. The House of Lords had 
to determine whether a car park was a ‘road’ for the purposes of holding the insurers and/or 
the MIB liable to compensate the claimants due to the limited practical prospect of recovery 
from the drivers. The Lords refused to provide a purposive interpretation of the RTA, instead 
referring the matter to Parliament to rectify. Per Lord Clyde  
 
One cannot but feel sympathy for the unfortunate victims of these two accidents but it 
must be for the Legislature to decide as matter of policy whether a remedy should be 
provided in such cases as these, and more particularly it must be for the Legislature to 
decide, if an alteration of the law is to be made, precisely how that alteration ought to 
be achieved.  
 
The ruling in Clarke did lead to a statutory change to extend national compulsory insurance 
to vehicles located in some ‘other public place’,
12
 but this falls short of the definition 
provided in Art. 1.  
 
Vnuk was also instructive in determining where ‘the use of vehicles’ would require the 
imposition of third party insurance cover. The accident having occurred on farm land, by a 
vehicle used exclusively on private land and not being subject, according to the law of 
Slovenia, to motor insurance did not prevent the imposition of compulsory insurance cover. 
The EU requirement for compulsory motor insurance (Art. 3(1) of the first MVID) did not 
stipulate a relation to the use of vehicles on public roads. The MVID contained no reference 
to a ‘traffic accident’ (as per Slovenia’s national legislative instrument) for the need to hold 
insurance cover to become effective. Taking a broad view, Advocate-General Mengozzi 
noted not only the evolution of the MVID across its six iterations,
13
 but also the underpinning 
practical dimension to its creation. Whilst the MVID had evolved to provide protection to the 
third party victims of road traffic accidents,
14
  it had first been established to remove the 
hindrance to the free movement of persons and goods through the insurance checks carried 
out at the borders of each Member State. As explained in the opinion, the second MVID laid 
down the principle of compulsory cover for damage to property and personal injuries, set the 
minimum guaranteed amounts of compensation and required the setting-up of a body with the 
task of providing compensation for damage caused by unidentified or uninsured vehicles,
15
 
and limited the exclusion clauses contained in insurance policies.
16
 The third MVID extended 
the cover to personal injuries to all passengers other than the driver
17
 and provided for the 
right of persons involved in an accident to information regarding the name of the insurance 
company concerned.
18
 The fourth MVID provided for the establishment of a new information 
centre
19
 and of a compensation body.
20
 The fifth MVID restricted insurance cover exclusion 
clauses and extended that cover to personal injuries and damage to property suffered by 
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pedestrians, cyclists and other road users, while prohibiting the application of excesses 




Indeed, when Advocate-General Mengozzi considered the application and interpretation of 
the MVID by Member States and the use of vehicles, there was little consistency present.
22
 
He continued by addressing the expansive nature of the CJEU’s jurisprudence. The CJEU 
purposively interpreted protective elements of the MVID broadly, whilst interpreting 
exclusions from compensation restrictively, thus demonstrating an interpretation of the law 
which was favourable to the victims of accidents.
23
 Consequently, it followed a consistent 
interpretation of the MVID for protection of individuals to extend to accidents occurring on 
private land. Such a finding would also end the inconsistent national practices on the 
identification of the geographic scope of compulsory motor insurance. For example, the 
Court of Cassation (Luxembourg) adopted the broad approach.
24
 Here a vehicle covered by 
insurance is, unless otherwise agreed, insured wherever it is, irrespective of whether or not 
the damage has been caused in a traffic incident. The restrictive approach was used by the 
Lietuvos vyriausiasis administracinis teismas (Lithuanian Supreme Administrative Court) 
where the owner of a vehicle involved in an accident occurring in an enclosed area was not 
subject to the obligation to take out insurance.
25
 It was clear that at the time of the Vnuk 
ruling, two broad approaches to the interpretation of the MVID existed. Member States 
would either adopt an expansive interpretation regarding any damage connected with the use 
or operation of a vehicle. The second approach was restricted to obligations to insure only in 
the event of road traffic accidents. Such inconsistency in approach was not helpful to a 
harmonised application of the MVID. 
 
It was further evident from the evolution of the wording used in the MVIDs that a departure 
from a vehicle-centred approach to a person-centred one lent itself to an assessment that the 
MVID was no longer entrenched in the ‘traffic accident’ and ‘use’ paradigm. The application 
of phraseology including an ‘accident caused... by a vehicle,’
26
 and ‘accidents caused by... 
vehicles,’
27
 along with Point 10 of Annex A to Directive 73/239
28
 where reference is made to 
civil liability ‘… arising out of the use of motor vehicles operating on the land’ resulted in the 
interpretation of Directive 73/239 so as not to restrict the risk to be covered to road traffic 
incidents.  
 
Thus, in the wake of Vnuk, ‘Vehicle’ includes any motor vehicle intended for travel on land 
(including agricultural machinery). The ‘use of vehicles’ includes any actions which are 
‘consistent with the normal function of that vehicle’
29
 and this is not a matter that is to be 
determined by Member States. The geographic scope of the requirement for compulsory 
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motor vehicle insurance extends to private land. It is not restricted to a road or other public 
place. 
 
A. THE CASE FACTS 
 
Case C-80/17 Fundo de Garantia Automóvel v Alina Antónia Destapado Pão Mole Juliana 
and Cristiana Micaela Caetano Juliana
30
 concerned Mrs Juliana, the owner of a car 
registered in Portugal. Given her deteriorating health she had stopped using the vehicle, had it 
immobilised and had parked it in the yard of her home, although it was in working order and 
capable of being driven. Consequently, she allowed the insurance coverage of the vehicle to 
lapse. Without her consent and knowledge, Mrs Juliana’s son took the car, made it work and 
in the course of driving it with two friends, the vehicle travelled off road and crashed, killing 
all three occupants. The issue for the CJEU was whether Mrs Juliana had failed to comply 
with the law regarding the compulsory insurance of vehicles. 
 
The EU has, since 1972, sought to harmonise the law regulating motor vehicle insurance. It 
has used the MVID to give effect to the free movement of goods and persons through 
establishing minimum standards of compulsory liability insurance. The MVID
31
 requires  
 
Each Member State [to]… take all appropriate measures to ensure that civil liability in 
respect of the use of vehicles normally based in its territory is covered by insurance. 
The extent of the liability covered and the terms and conditions of the cover shall be 




In accordance with Portuguese law applied at the time of the accident  
 
Every person who may have civil liability to pay compensation for financial damage 
and non-financial damage deriving from damage to property or personal injuries 
caused to third parties by any land-based motor vehicle… must, to enable the vehicle 
to be used, be covered… by insurance covering that liability. (Art. 1(1) of Decreto-
Lei No 522/85 — Seguro Obrigatório de Responsabilidade Civil Automóvel (Decree 
Law No 522/85 concerning compulsory motor vehicle insurance against civil 
liability) of 31 December 1985).  
 
This obligation fell on the owner of the vehicle. The Decree Law also provided, at Art. 21, 
for a compensatory body to satisfy claims of compensation caused by such vehicles and, at 
Art. 25, following the payment of compensation the compensation body is to be subrogated 
to the rights of the victim. Any person subject to the obligation to insure and who failed to 
take out coverage may be sued by the fund to recover a payment made. 
 
Finally, Art. 503(1) of the Civil Code provided that every person with control of any land-
based motor vehicle and who used this for their own needs was liable for the damage 
resulting from the risks inherent in the vehicle, whether or not the vehicle was in use.  
 
Taken together, the Portuguese law required compulsory motor vehicle insurance to be held 
for any ‘land-based motor vehicle.’ EU law, as noted above, imposed an obligation on each 
                                                 
30
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31
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32
 ibid Article 3(1). 
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Member State to establish a guarantee fund to act as the insurer of last resort
33
 on the basis 
that, for example, a driver causing an accident involving a motor vehicle is uninsured or 
untraced. In Portugal the Fundo de Garantia Automóvel occupies the position of motor 
vehicle guarantee fund and it satisfied the claim for compensation associated with the 
accident. The Fundo de Garantia Automóvel considered that Mrs Juliana was subject to an 
obligation to insure her vehicle against civil liability and claimed the €437,345.85 it had paid 
in compensation to the passenger victims.
34
 Mrs Juliana denied that she was liable for the 
accident or under an obligation to hold insurance for a vehicle parked on private land. The 










1. Must Article 3 of [the First Directive] be interpreted as meaning that the obligation 
to take out motor vehicle civil liability insurance extends even to situations in which 





Must it be interpreted as meaning that in those circumstances, the owner of the 
vehicle is not under an obligation to insure, regardless of the liability of the Fund … 
to third party victims, in particular in cases of unauthorised use of a motor vehicle? 
 
2. Must Article 1(4) of [the Second Directive] be interpreted as meaning that the Fund 
… which, because there was no… insurance contract, paid the relevant compensation 
to the third party victims of the traffic accident… has the right of subrogation against 





Must it be interpreted as meaning that the subrogation by the Fund ... in relation to the 
owner depends on the prerequisites of civil liability…, in particular the condition that, 
when the accident occurred, the owner had actual control of the vehicle? 
 
In answer to the first question the CJEU held that Art. 3(1) was to be interpreted as meaning 
that for the use of a motor vehicle, insurance cover is obligatory when the vehicle is 
registered in a Member State and is capable of being driven but is parked on private land. A 
vehicle in this state is still a ‘vehicle’ for the purposes of the definition provided in the 
MVID. Indeed, were this not the case, then in the absence of a requirement of such a vehicle 
                                                 
33
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35
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 7 
to be insured, the national guarantee fund body would be under no obligation to satisfy 




Answering the second question, the court considered that Art. 1(4) of the Second Directive 
did not prevent a Member State from legislating to give effect to a compensating body to 
bring a claim to recover damages against a vehicle owner who had failed to have in place 
insurance cover on that vehicle.
38
 Further, this did not prevent the compensatory body from 
seeking to recover monies from the person who caused the accident, in addition to, or in 
substitution of the person responsible for the accident. Member States would also not be 
precluded from taking this action even in the absence of any civil liability on the owner,
39
 a 
point that the Supreme Court of Portugal considered ‘disproportionate.’ 
 
Juliana thus continued the general principle established in Vnuk. Motor vehicles on private 
land, even where they have been officially withdrawn from use (for example as in the UK 
through a Statutory Off Road Notification (SORN) declaration)
40
 and are capable of being 
driven, are to be considered vehicles for the purposes of the MVID. Regardless of the 
owner’s intention (adopting the Advocate-General’s objective rather than subjective test) not 
to use the vehicle, and the fact that it is maintained on private land, the obligation for 
compulsory insurance persists. The CJEU also made reference to its jurisprudence in Vnuk, 
Rodrigues de Andrade and another v Proença Salvador [Andrade]
41
 and Torreiro v AIG 
Europe Limited, Sucursal en España and Unión Española de Entidades Aseguradoras y 
Reaseguradoras (Unespa)
42
 but excluded these from its deliberations as the cases related to 
situations following from an insured vehicle rather than whether the obligation to insure the 
vehicle in question existed. 
 
The cases are instructive of the changing law on the duty to insure motor vehicles, although 
they differ as to the scope to which obligations to third party victims exist. Andrade involved 
Mrs Maria Alves who died in March 2006 following an accident at work. A tractor was being 
used to deliver herbicide at a vineyard. The vehicle was stationary and parked on a sloped 
terrace. Its weight, the vibration of the tractor’s motor as a pump to administer the spray and 
recent heavy rainfall led to a landslip where the vehicle crushed Alves. Alves’ widower 
sought damages against, among others, the insurer with whom the owner of the vehicle had a 
policy against liability in respect of the use of the vehicle. The insurer denied liability beyond 
material losses. The tractor had been insured in relation to occupational accidents. Under 
Portuguese law, claims against two of the defendants had to be dismissed because the tractor 
was not involved in a ‘traffic accident’ which was capable of being covered by insurance 
against civil liability. The accident had not occurred when the tractor was being used as a 
                                                 
37
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has no liability for any claim ‘arising out of the use of a vehicle which is not required to be covered by a 
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38
 ibid at [56]. 
39
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40
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 Thereby the Tribunal da Relação de Guimarães (Court of Appeal, 
Guimarães, Portugal) referred questions to the CJEU in respect of the requirement for 
vehicles used on private land to be covered by insurance. The CJEU had held in Vnuk that all 
vehicles ‘whose use is consistent with the normal function of that vehicle’ were subject to 
insurance. In Andrade, the CJEU identified that ‘the circumstances of the case that gave rise 
to [Vnuk] are such that it may be concluded that the normal function of a vehicle is to be in 
motion.’
44
 There was no distinction between the application of that requirement to vehicles 
on public or private land. In Andrade the tractor had been stationary at the time of the 
accident and the Tribunal da Relação de Guimarães asked the CJEU to clarify the wording 
used in the Vnuk judgment. The Portuguese court considered that the ‘normal function’ of a 
vehicle meant that it was in motion. The court requested clarification on the status on the ‘use 
of a vehicle’ which was being used as a machine for generating power (here the tractor was 
being used to power the spray in dispensing the herbicide) and not being used for the purpose 
of travel. The CJEU referred to Vnuk when identifying that the obligation to hold motor 
vehicle insurance was not dependent on whether a vehicle was moving or stationary, if its 
engine was running or turned off, or where the vehicle was being used (public or private 
land). It did concede that some vehicles can have different functions depending on the 
circumstances in which they are being used. Thus, a tractor for instance may be used as a 
means of transport, but it may also be used as a generator to power a herbicide sprayer. 
Depending on its particular use at the time of the accident would determine whether 
insurance cover was compulsory or not. 
 
The CJEU held against the requirement for vehicles such as tractors being used in the 
capacity in Andrade to be subject to compulsory insurance. In terms of the ‘use of vehicles,’ 
the MVID does not, considered the CJEU, cover a situation where an agricultural vehicle has 
been involved in an accident when its principal function,
45
 at the time of the accident, was not 
as a means of transport but rather for the carrying out of work.
46
 This will require further 
guidance and detailed instruction to identify where the obligation begins and ends.  
 
A. RECONCILING VNUK, JULIANA, ANDRADE AND ENGLISH LAW 
 
The facts of Vnuk have been well documented since the CJEU judgment in 2014. In that case, 
a farmworker was injured whilst on a ladder in a barn. The ladder on which he was standing 
was struck by the driver of a tractor reversing a trailer. The tractor was not subject to 
insurance as, under the law of Slovenia, a vehicle used exclusively on private land was not so 
required. The CJEU pronounced on two main issues. The first was of the definition of a 
‘motor vehicle’ for the purposes of the MVID.
47
 Any vehicle which is intended for travel on 
land and propelled by mechanical power (although not running on rails), and any trailer, 
whether coupled to a vehicle or not, falls within the MVID’s
48
 definition of vehicle.
49
 The 
second point of law established related to the ‘use’ of that vehicle. Where a tractor (for the 
purposes of the Vnuk ruling) is being used consistently within the sense of the normal 
function of such a vehicle, it is within the scope of the MVID, regardless of the geographic 
range of that use. Thus, national law fails to be in conformity with the judgment. In RTA 
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45
 ibid at [41]. 
46
 ibid at [42]. 
47




 As provided in the first MVID, Article 1. 
 9 
Section 185 the definition of vehicle provides: “motor car” means a mechanically propelled 
vehicle, not being a motor cycle or an invalid carriage, which is constructed itself to carry a 
load or passengers… The section of the Act continues its definition through reference to the 
weight of the vehicle depending on whether it is intended to carry passengers or goods. The 
UK definition is therefore significantly narrower (perhaps unnecessarily so) than that which 
exists for the MVID, and the MVID and RTA concepts of a ‘vehicle’ and its ‘use’ differ on 
substantive points. 
 
The scope of the use of a vehicle and the extent to the requirements for its owner to carry 
liability insurance cover are also different. English law, in the RTA at least, requires that 
vehicles used on a ‘road or other public place’ are subject to compulsory insurance, but those 
used exclusively on private land are not. The Court of Appeal in MIB v Lewis ruled that the 
UK breached its EU obligations through the restrictive definition in national law. It gave 
judgment in favour of a third party victim who suffered injury on private land by the driver of 
an uninsured vehicle. The Court extended the scope of protection by holding the MIB to be 
an emanation of the State and followed the CJEU’s judgment in Juliana regarding 
compulsory insurance extending to vehicles used on private land. It is worthy of note, 
however, that as recently as March 2019 the Supreme Court, when asked whether a purposive 
interpretation of the RTA to give effect to the MVID was possible, it refused.
50
 The ruling in 
MIB v Lewis does not, of course, change the RTA definition and until new Agreements are 
concluded between the MIB and Secretary of State, national law and the EU obligations 
remain substantially opposed. 
 
In response to Vnuk, in June 2016, the EU Commission undertook a consultation exercise, its 
‘Adaptation of the scope of Directive 2009/103/EC on motor insurance.’
51
 The consultation 
sought opinions on four options in light of the judgment. The first was for no action to be 
taken and Member States would simply have to implement the new direction provided by 
Vnuk in national law. Another option included for the amendment of the existing guarantee 
fund body to ensure additional resources were available to satisfy claims by third party 
victims of accidents on private land. The Commission suggested that certain vehicles could 
be subject to derogation from insurance requirements, but this would impose responsibility 
for the satisfaction of such claims to be undertaken by the guarantee fund, and its final option 
was for an amendment to the sixth MVID to possibly limit the effects of Vnuk. 
 
National law, whilst being the inspiration for the first MVID, has frequently been at odds 
with the EU parent law. Whilst national courts, particularly the Court of Appeal, have held 
English law to comply with the spirit and overall aims of the MVID
52
 (and arguably 
erroneously on these points), there are notable cases where the UK has been held in breach of 
its obligations and subject to successful state liability claims for damage suffered as a result 
of its breach of the MVID.
53
 Indeed, motor vehicle insurance law is one of the few areas of 
national jurisprudence where state liability has been a successful avenue for securing access 
to compensation for breach of EU law, if not in enabling access to those EU rights. 
 
The Andrade judgment raises many issues which will have to be (re)considered by the CJEU 
and in the consultation process held by the EU Commission when establishing its seventh 
                                                 
50
 R & S Pilling t/a Phoenix Engineering v UK Insurance [2019] UKSC 16, [2019] 2 WLR 1015, per Lord 




 RoadPeace v Secretary of State for Transport [2017] EWHC 2725 (Admin). 
53
 See Byrne v Motor Insurers' Bureau [2008] EWCA Civ 574 and Delaney v Pickett [2011] EWCA Civ 1532. 
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MVID. If the Vnuk ruling was unexpected, there was at least a sense of reason to its creation. 
Where a third party victim of a motor vehicle accident suffers loss, it is important that they 
are protected through the imposition of compulsory liability insurance. Even where such 
vehicles never leave the confines of private land, if individuals are permitted to visit and 
work in proximity with such vehicles, it is reasonable to foresee the potential for accidents to 
occur in the use of a motor vehicle. The Andrade judgment takes the journey started in Vnuk 
in a different, possibly hazardous, direction.  
 
First, it seems odd that Andrade and Juliana, being the most recent pronouncements on the 
issue of compulsory motor insurance by the CJEU, can have such different approaches. 
Nowhere in the MVID exists instruction that compulsory motor insurance is confined to the 
use of vehicles for transport. Andrade seeks to change the imposition from Vnuk that motor 
vehicles must be insured where they are being used according to their normal function. It 
must be accepted that the powering of agricultural equipment forms part of the normal 
function of a tractor (in the same way as using such a vehicle to transport a trailer – per 
Vnuk). The further implications of the judgment includes the incidental effect that using 
vehicles may have. For instance, using a tractor (to continue the Vnuk / Andrade theme) to 
plough a field involves it being used for the purposes of work, yet it will be used as a means 
of transport to fulfil this task. Would Andrade hold any accident occurring during the course 
of this activity as exempt from the requirement of insurance? Will the CJEU consider the 
timing of the accident as determinative of the need for insurance? Perhaps the CJEU will 
adopt an incidental effect similar to the law relating to acts performed in the course of 
employment and thus attracting the vicarious liability of a principal. The judgment also has 
implications for cases being heard in the UK and for the potential liability in damages against 
the State. In June 2019 the Court of Appeal provided its judgment in MIB v Lewis. The case 
facts involved the Mr Lewis having suffered grievous injury following being struck, 
deliberately, by the (uninsured) driver of a four-wheel drive vehicle. The High Court ruled 
inter alia, and following the reasoning established in Vnuk, that whilst the injury involving 
the vehicle occurred on private land, the vehicle must be subject to compulsory insurance. 
However, the High Court did not seemingly concern itself with Andrade and its effect on 
such activity, while the Court of Appeal gave the case merely a cursory mention.
54
 In Lewis, 
the driver of the vehicle was chasing two men he suspected of stealing scrap metal from his 
property, he pursued them along a private lane, drove through a barbed wire fence on to 
private land where he struck one of the men and caused the injury. There is no doubt that the 
vehicle was being used in the context of transport, yet this was incidental to it being used as 
an instrument to catch (and perhaps to apprehend) the fleeing (suspected) burglar. The issue 
of the use of a car as a means to injure a person has previously been considered by the Court 
of Appeal in Keeley v Pashen & Anor.
55
 The driver of a mini-cab (Mr Pashen) deliberately 
drove his vehicle at four men, previous passengers in his vehicle, after, claimed the driver, he 
had been subject to an attack by them. It was accepted in the criminal trial associated with 
this event that the driver was in a state of panic at the time of the incident and he had merely 
intended to frighten the men. In this case, Brooke LJ used a somewhat convoluted method of 
enabling the widow of the victim (Mr Keeley) to recover damages from Mr Pashen’s insurer 
because, whilst Mr Pashen’s insurance only covered ‘social, domestic and pleasure’ use of 
the vehicle, these being the last customers of his shift, and albeit only 16 seconds had elapsed 
between the men leaving the mini-cab and the injury to Mr Keeley, the essential character of 
Mr Pashen’s journey was to drive home. He was no longer using the vehicle as a mini-cab. 
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The reversing up the road to engage the men (where the injury took place) was an incidental 
episode and should not be considered as a separate journey.
56
 This point had already been 
established through the judgment delivered by Roskill and Megaw LJJ in Seddon v Binions
57
 
where Megaw LJ explained  
 
if there be such a primary purpose, or essential character, then the Courts should not 
be meticulous to seek some possible secondary purpose, or some inessential character, 
the result of which could be suggested to be that the use of the car fell outside the 
proper use for the purposes of which cover was given by the insurance policy.  
 
What was the primary purpose of the driver’s journey in Lewis? Was the motor vehicle being 
used as a ‘means of transport’ for the driver to reach the suspected burglars or was it intended 
to be used as a weapon with its transport function merely ancillary to this aim? 
 
Thus, might Andrade have been used by the Court of Appeal to limit the effect of Vnuk and 
restrict its application in the UK? Also, the requirement to hold insurance for motor vehicles 
on private land attracted the attention of its extension to the criminal law applying in these 
hitherto unregulated areas. The Court of Appeal followed the Vnuk/Juliana jurisprudence 
relating to the requirement for the compulsory insurance of motor vehicles on private land 
but failed to consider the broader implications of the ruling in respect of criminal liability and 
its enforcement. 
 
Andrade seems to mirror a situation that occurred in England through the 2015 Uninsured 
Drivers Agreement which had the potential for significant unintended consequences relating 
to the ‘normal use of a vehicle.’ In the 2015 Agreement, the MIB sought to exclude its 
liability in the event of the use of a vehicle for the purposes of terrorism (Clause 9).
58
 It was 
arguable that here the MIB was attempting to exclude its liability for loss where a vehicle 
was used as, for example, a car bomb. This clearly would not have been the normal, expected 
use of such a vehicle. Therefore the Agreement was proactively seeking to prevent the MIB 
being called upon to settle any damages claims from third party victims when no insurance 
cover was applicable.
59
 Unfortunately for it and the wording used in the Agreement, the 
attempted exclusion was so broad as to cover a multitude of scenarios which would not 
necessarily be thought of as terrorist-related but would have been included in the exclusion 
permitted in Clause 9.
60
 This would, had it been tested, have breached the MVID which 
permitted an exclusion of liability by an insurer on one ground only, which is not an act of 
terrorism.
61
 This was not, we argue, what the MIB envisaged when creating Clause 9 of the 
Agreement but this is where a literal reading of the text led (the exclusion clause was 
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subsequently removed in the Supplementary Agreement 2017). Precision in the drafting of 
Agreements, contracts and judgments is essential to avoid the unintended consequences of 
subsequent uncertainty.
62
 The ruling in Andrade requires further guidance and detailed 
instruction to identify the extent of the obligation to insure and its compatibility with the 
MVID. It would be more consistent with the tenor of the MVID and the Vnuk/Juliana 
judgments for the extension of the requirement for compulsory motor insurance to apply to 
all motor vehicles on private land. Andrade should be reversed to end conflicting 
jurisprudence which attempts to distinguish between different categories of motor vehicles 
for the purposes of compulsory insurance cover. Vnuk’s ‘normal use of a vehicle’ condition 
for the imposition of compulsory insurance is a common sense approach. Whilst it is 
recognised that certain types of vehicle (especially those used in agricultural ventures) may 
have more than one function, it must be remembered that the judiciary’s journey of clarifying 
the extent of the MVID in Vnuk began with an accident involving a tractor. To attempt to 
differentiate between the application of insurance cover depending on the particular use of a 
vehicle at the exact time of an accident establishes a level of uncertainty for all parties which 
is unhelpful and fundamentally illogical. Particularly so given the trajectory of the 




The extension of the obligation on Member States to ensure motor vehicles used on private 
land were covered by insurance began with Vnuk. In such circumstances, the innocent third 
party victims of uninsured drivers would have, as a minimum, recourse to the national 
compensation body to recover damages. In the aftermath of the judgment, bodies including 
the MIB disagreed with this extension of the law and considered that the CJEU had erred in 
its interpretation of the sixth MVID. It was buoyed in its maintenance of this impression by 
the EU Commission undertaking a consultation exercise in light of the ruling, ahead of a 
seventh MVID. Further, Andrade seemed to offer a boundary to the extent of such liability. 
Here vehicles, particularly agricultural vehicles, were recognised as possessing multiple 
functions and the CJEU restricted compulsory insurance only where such a machine (which 
was capable of carrying out work) was used in its function as a vehicle. This creates a tension 
in the correct identification of the functioning of a vehicle. The tractor in Andrade, being 
used to dispense herbicide, was stationary at the time of the accident. The CJEU considered 
the ‘normal use of the vehicle’ (in adopting the terminology used in Vnuk) to be when it is 
principally being used as a means of transport. However, this is contrary to the finding of the 
Court in Juliana where it expressly identified that the MVID requires insurance to be held for 
vehicles whether they are moving or not. The only requirement is that the vehicle is capable 
of being moved (ie capable of being used as a means of transport). To hold otherwise would 
be to remove the requirement of insurance for these vehicles and thereby removing the 
protection afforded through the national compensation guarantee fund. Thus, the stationary 
car in Juliana is subject to compulsory insurance yet the stationary tractor in Andrade is not. 
Further, presumably, had the tractor in Andrade been moving to a new location (perhaps only 
a few feet) whilst on the terrace and had then slipped down the hill crushing the victim, the 
insurance would have come into effect as it was, at that moment, a vehicle rather than a 
machine.  
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Ultimately, whilst the jurisprudence of the CJEU has clarified the instruction in the MVID 
relating to the geographic scope of where compulsory insurance exists, and offers greater 
protection to third party victims of accidents involving motor vehicles, the latest cases seem 
to differ on substantial points. Given the prevalence of agricultural, construction and 
industrial vehicles used exclusively on private land and thus more likely to be uninsured 
under the current insurance regime than those vehicles with access to a road and other public 
place, for Andrade to draw a distinction between their use as a machine and as a vehicle blurs 
the lines of where compulsory insurance takes effect. Further, that these cases are referred to 
by the EU Parliament in its proposal for amendment to the MVID without drawing the 
distinctions raised in this note is unhelpful.
63
 Such uncertainty is not beneficial to anyone and 
the CJEU should, we consider, clarify this point of law by fully adopting its reasoning in 
Juliana and explicitly overruling Andrade.   
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